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AEC ASEAN Economic Community
ASEAN Association of Southeast Asian Nations
CIL Country Insights Lab
CSIP Center for Social Initiatives Promotion
FDI Foreign Direct Investment
HCMC Ho Chi Minh City
INGO International Non-Governmental Organisation
MDG Millennium Development Goals
NGO Non-Governmental Organisation
ODA Official Development Assistance
PACCOM People’s Aid Coordinating Committee
RCEP Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership
SE Social Enterprise
SIO Social Impact Organisation
SOE State-Owned Enterprise
ToT Training of Trainers
TPP Trans-Pacific Partnership
UNDP United Nations Development Programme
UXO Unexploded Ordnance
VCF VinaCapital Foundation
VCP Vietnamese Communist Party
VND Vietnamese Dong
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III. About the Country Insights Lab Series 
The Institute for Societal Leadership conducted a series of eleven Country Insights 
Labs (CILs) in select Southeast Asian cities between June 2014 and June 2015. 
Each CIL aimed to uncover the critical social and environmental issues facing 
leaders from business, government and civil society in a given country and frame 
the underlying causes behind each issue within the country’s context. The study 
identified emerging trends in Southeast Asia and has since directed further re-
search toward interconnected social and environmental issues shared among 
countries in the region. 
Additionally, ISL research staff investigated the day-to-day organisational chal-
lenges faced by social impact organisations (SIOs) in each Southeast Asian coun-
try. We broadly defined an SIO as any organisation with the capacity to contribute 
to the betterment of communities. These included, but were not limited to, phil-
anthropic organisations, corporate foundations, non-governmental organisations 
(NGOs), activist groups, social enterprises and impact investors. Interviews fo-
cussed on challenges associated with funding models, human resources, tax in-
centives, legal frameworks and government registration processes. In total, re-
search staff interviewed 237 organisations and 293 individuals, including govern-
ment officials, business leaders, philanthropists, NGO workers, social entrepre-
neurs, media professionals and academics. The interviews themselves consisted of 
questions relating to organisational history, operations, strategic outlook, cross-
sector collaboration, leadership and country context.  1
The Institute did not intend the CIL series to be exhaustive or to produce statisti-
cally significant data. On the contrary, the series was a qualitative study that em-
ployed interviews and market insights as a means of understanding an increasing-
ly complex landscape. As one of the world’s most diverse regions, Southeast Asia 
is home to an array of cultures, languages, religions and economic levels of devel-
opment. At the cornerstone of each country study is a belief that workable solu-
tions and partnerships depend on an awareness of how each country’s unique 
context relates to its social issues. 
The ISL research team conducted interviews in Ho Chi Minh City between 22–23 
December 2014 and 4–6 February 2015 and in Hanoi between 1–3 February 
2015. 
 For a list of sample questions, see section VI. 1
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IV. Vietnam  
A. Historical Background 
Although most of Southeast Asia is home to reli-
gions and cultures carrying significant Indic influ-
ence, Vietnam alone is the mainland’s only Sini-
cised culture. Chinese emperors directly ruled 
northern Vietnam for most of the period spanning 
111 BCE to 938 CE. The next eight hundred years 
saw a series of independent Vietnamese king-
doms administered by Chinese-style mandarins 
gradually extend control over and supplant the 
Indic Champa civilisation to the south—even as 
French incursions began chipping away at Viet-
namese territory as early as 1858. By 1884, the 
French had established control over the entire 
territory which included all of present-day Viet-
nam, Cambodia and Laos. During World War II, 
Japan took control of French Indochina until its 
defeat in 1945, but France continued to rule Viet-
nam until 1954 when Vietnamese Communists or 
Viet Minh led by Ho Chi Minh gained control of 
North Vietnam.    On 7 May 1954, after a 57-day 
siege, more than 10, 000 starving French troops 
surrendered to the Viet Minh at  Dien Bien Phu. 
This was a catastrophic defeat that brought an 
end to French colonialism in Indochina. The fol-
lowing day, the  Geneva  Conference opened to 
negotiate an end to the conflict. Resolutions in-
cluded an exchange of prisoners, the temporary 
division of Vietnam into two zones at the Ben Hai 
River (near the 17th Parallel) until nationwide elec-
tions could be held,   the free passage of people 
across the 17th Parallel for a period of 300 days, 
and the holding of nationwide elections on 20 
July 1956.  However no elections were held and 
the division of Vietnam became permanent with 
Ho Chih Minh as leader of a communist regime 
and  Ngo Dinh Diem still holding power in the 
south. It wasn’t long before South Vietnam was 
rocked by demonstrations and Diem was ousted 
in a coup in 1963. The US’s involvement in the 
Vietnam War began as  early  as 1950 when they 
sent military advisers to South Vietnam, gave fi-
nancial support to the French and later the South 
Vietnamese government. When two American 
ships were allegedly attacked by the North Viet-
namese in 1964, the Americans began their 
bombing campaign of the north by sending 
183,000 soldiers to prevent ‘further aggression’. 
By the end of 1967 there were nearly half a mil-
lion American soldiers waging war against the 
Vietcong or Northern guerillas. Even though the 
Vietcongs  launched massive offensives in towns 
and cities across South Vietnam and suffered 
heavy losses, the Americans gradually withdrew 
from Vietnam due to pressure from the Americans 
on the home front who were bombarded by hor-
rific images of the war on their television screens 
and campaigned against it. In January 1973 they 
signed a ceasefire and the remaining American 
troops withdrew. The South Vietnamese contin-
ued the fight until the early months of 1975 when 
their resistance collapsed and Saigon was cap-
tured. Communist victory and reunification of the 
country as the Socialist Republic of Vietnam was 
achieved in 1975.  
For over a decade after reunification, Vietnam 
experienced little economic growth because of its 
centralized economic policies and growing in-
ternational isolation, while Vietnam's 1978 inva-
sion of Cambodia resulted in tensions and fight-
ing with China. Vietnam began to emerge from 
international isolation after it withdrew its troops 
from Cambodia in 1989. China re-established full 
diplomatic ties with Vietnam in 1991, and a visit to 
Vietnam by United States President Bill Clinton in 
2000 was the culmination of the efforts by both 
countries to normalize relations. 
Vietnam’s struggle for independence had been 
the chief fixation of American containment poli-
cies during the height of the Cold War, but the 
country has managed to overcome its reputation 
as a battlefield since the overwhelming success of 
its manufacturing economy in recent years. In 
spite of slowdowns, Vietnam continues to be re-
garded as a textbook case for the virtues of mar-
ket-oriented reform and its ability to generate 
rapid economic development. With its economy 
in shambles at the end of the Second Indochina 
War in 1975, Vietnam has since risen to become 
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the 57th largest economy in the world and the 6th 
largest in Southeast Asia. As recently as 1979, the 
Vietnamese people suffered widespread famine. 
Today, their country is the second largest rice ex-
porter globally. In 2008, the World Bank reclassi-
fied Vietnam as a “lower middle-income country” 
after gross national income per capita surpassed 
US$1000. 
Liberalisation and subsequent economic growth 
have come to Vietnam through a series of cau-
tious piecemeal reforms, many of which are still 
ongoing. Its socialist government flirted with mar-
ket-oriented economics as early as 1979, allowing 
farmers and state-owned enterprises (SOEs) to 
sell surplus stock after meeting government quo-
tas. The 1986 Doi Moi  reforms formally privatised 2
the Vietnamese economy, permitting rice farmers 
to earn to up to 40 percent profits on sales of rice 
and factory workers to earn bonuses and piece-
rate wages.  However, Vietnam’s economy truly 3
took off with the explosion of foreign direct in-
vestment in the mid-1990s. The end of Soviet aid 
programmes and Vietnam’s withdrawal of its mili-
tary from Cambodia in 1989 paved the way for 
the lifting of the U.S. trade embargo in 1994, sub-
sequent U.S. approval of International Monetary 
Fund loans and a substantial widening of official 
development assistance (ODA) from the U.S. and 
its allies. In spite of the 1997 Asian Financial Cri-
sis, Vietnam posted on average 7.4 percent annu-
al growth between 1992 and 2007.  4
Unfortunately, the high growth rate has stalled in 
recent years, revealing cracks and inefficiencies in 
Vietnam’s “socialist-oriented market economy.”  5
 Doi Moi literally means to “change to something new.” It is often translated as “renovation.”2
 D.R. SarDesai, Southeast Asia: Past & Present, Fifth Edition (Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press, 2003), 355.3
 “World Development Indicators,” The World Bank, accessed 22 February 2015, http://data.worldbank.org/.4
 Kinh tế thị trường theo định hướng xã hội chủ nghĩa in Vietnamese.5
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Vietnam By Numbers 
Surface Area: 
330,957 sq km
Population: 
90.80 million [2012]
Population Density: 
274.3 per sq km
Population of Hanoi: 
2.96 million [2011]
Population of HCMC: 
7.96 million [2014]
Urban Population: 
32.3% [2013 ]
Currency: 
Vietnamese Dong (VND)
GDP (Nominal) 
US$155.82 billion [2012]
Growth Rate: 
5.3% [2012]
GDP Per Capita: 
US$1716.20 [2012]
Unemployment: 
1.8% [2012]
Tourist Arrivals Annually: 
6.85 million [2012]
Mobile-Cellular Subscriptions: 
149.4 per 100 inhabitants [2012]
Individuals Using Internet: 
39.5% [2012]
Life Expectancy at Birth: 
Females (80.4 years), Males (71.2 years)
Forested Area: 
45% [2011]
Source: UN Data (http://data.un.org)
Vietnam’s accession to the World Trade Organisa-
tion in 2007 and the liberalisation of stocks and 
real estate markets that precipitated its member-
ship attracted an unprecedented number of for-
eign transactions using the Vietnamese dong. 
Without an independent central bank to enforce 
monetary policy, inflation rates ran as high as 18.7 
percent in 2011.  At the same time, growth has 6
been sluggish, averaging only 5.7 percent in the 
last six years.   7
Vietnam’s distinctive SOEs, which continue to 
dominate its business sector, have largely failed 
to update their corporate governance practices to 
global standards. However, they have none-
theless managed to expand their businesses with 
easy money from government-guaranteed for-
eign debt and bonds—all with little regard for 
market research or business analysis. SOEs ac-
counted for 45 percent of new foreign investment 
between 2006 and 2010, but were responsible for 
only 19 percent of GDP growth during that same 
period.  In some cases, SOEs have gone outside 8
their government mandate to purchase real es-
tate, stocks and even equity in the very financial 
institutions funding them. In 2012, state-owned 
shipping lines Vinashin and Vinalines scandalised 
the nation when it was revealed that each had 
accumulated US$4.5 billion and US$2.1 billion 
respectively in debt from faulty investments.  In 9
the last two years, the State Bank of Vietnam has 
largely brought runaway inflation under control 
through increased interest rates, but the country’s 
continued economic success will depend on its 
ability to maintain investor confidence by improv-
ing standards of corporate governance.  
In 2015, Vietnam will also have to navigate a 
number of upcoming trade agreements while 
balancing its relationships with China, the U.S. 
and ASEAN. Vietnam continues to struggle with 
Chinese regional dominance, especially conflict-
ing claims over the Spratley and Paracel island 
groups in the South China Sea. 2014 witnessed 
multiple conflagrations, including a Chinese deep 
sea oil rig occupying Vietnamese-claimed waters 
and anti-Chinese riots at foreign industrial centres 
in Binh Duong and Ha Tinh provinces. At the 
same time, Vietnamese manufacturing is still 
largely dependent on Chinese materials—it runs a 
US$24 billion trade deficit—and Vietnam cannot 
afford to push its northern neighbour too hard.  10
Although the Vietnamese government recently 
voiced support for the Philippines’ maritime suit 
against China in the Permanent Court of Arbitra-
tion, it stopped short of joining the suit or filing its 
own. Both the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) and 
the ASEAN Economic Community (AEC) could 
provide Vietnam with cheap alternatives to Chi-
nese yarn and machine parts as well as additional 
leverage with Chinese maritime claims, but it is 
unclear how successful either initiative will be. 
Vietnam will move forward with multilateral nego-
tiations on the TPP throughout 2015. The AEC is 
scheduled to go into effect at the end of the year. 
B. Current Challenges 
❖ Remote populations, particularly ethnic minori-
ties, overwhelmingly lack access to education 
and health care. In spite of Vietnam’s increased 
income levels, remote ethnic minority communi-
ties have few opportunities for economic ad-
vancement. The Vietnamese government officially 
recognises 53 distinct minority ethnic groups, 
including Tay, Khmer Krom, Hoa, Nung and 
Hmong, which together make up 14 percent of 
the population (nearly 13 million people).  Ap11 -
 “World Development Indicators,” The World Bank.6
 Ibid.7
 Tran Van Tho, “Vietnamese Economy at the Crossroads: New Doi Moi for Sustained Growth,” Asian Economic Policy Review 8 (2013), 131.8
 Ngo Thi Ngoc Chau, “In Vietnam, a shipping line raises alarm over debt,” Reuters, 26 June 2012, accessed 22 February 2015, http://9
www.reuters.com/article/2012/06/27/us-vietnam-vinalines-idUSBRE85Q01S20120627.
 “Through a border darkly: Relations between two Communist neighbours are at their lowest point in decades,” The Economist, 16 August 10
2014, accessed 22 February 2015, http://www.economist.com/news/asia/21612234-relations-between-two-communist-neighbours-are-
their-lowest-point-decades-through-border.
 Dang Hai-Anh. “Vietnam: A Widening Poverty Gap for Ethnic Minorities,” in Indigenous Peoples, Poverty and Development, edited by 11
Gillette H. Hall and Harry Anthony Patrinos, 304–343 (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2014), 305.
 7
proximately half of all ethnic minority Vietnamese 
live below the poverty line. Children from these 
groups may experience difficulty travelling to 
school, or else attend schools with undertrained 
teachers or inadequate facilities. Girls, in particu-
lar, may be expected to help with household 
chores at the expense of their education. Or,  they 
may be married off at an early age, effectively 
putting an end to their studies. Children in Viet-
nam’s remote communities also lack access to 
basic medical care, including vaccinations. Ethnic 
minority children are three times more likely to 
die before reaching five years of age than chil-
dren from the Vietnamese majority.  12
❖ Vietnam is among the most extensively mined 
countries in the world, and unexploded ordi-
nances (UXOs), including land mines and cluster 
munitions, continue to kill and maim Vietnamese. 
All 63 of Vietnam’s provinces and cities are cont-
aminated with UXOs from wars fought with Cam-
bodia, China, France and the United States be-
tween 1946 and 1989. It is estimated that up to 
66,000 sq km (one-fifth of Vietnam’s landmass) 
contain unexploded cluster munitions or active 
mines. 2,121 people were injured or killed in inci-
dents involving UXOs in 2013, and victims’ rights 
groups estimate that there are currently between 
66,000 and 100,000 survivors of UXOs in Viet-
nam. In recent years, the Vietnamese government 
has made efforts to expand access to free health-
care and physical rehabilitation for UXO survivors, 
having established the Vietnam Federation on 
Disability to coördinate victims assistance pro-
grammes in 2011.  However, the government 13
alone is currently unable to shoulder the massive 
costs associated with UXO disposal, UXO aware-
ness campaigns and victim support and rehabili-
tation. 
At the time of this writing, the Ministry of National 
Defence oversees mine removal in coordination 
with select INGOs and social enterprises. The 
VUFO-NGO Resource Centre has also convened a 
working group on UXO disposal. 
❖ Vietnamese men, women and children contin-
ue to be vulnerable to traffickers working within 
Vietnam and on the Cambodian and Chinese 
borders. In addition to being a destination for 
child sex tourism, Vietnam is also a major source 
country for forced labour and sex trafficking out-
side its borders. Several of Vietnam’s labour ex-
port companies, some of which are affiliated with 
SOEs, have at times charged fees in excess of 
legal limits and placed workers in debt bondage 
situations in Japan, Laos, Malaysia, South Korea, 
Taiwan and the United Arab Emirates. Significant 
numbers of Vietnamese women, particularly do-
mestic factory workers, have been lured into sex 
trafficking rings in China, Cambodia, Malaysia and 
Russia—usually with offers of foreign manufactur-
ing jobs. China’s gender imbalance has also in-
creased demand for internationally brokered mar-
riages. Some women, having relocated to China, 
Singapore or South Korea as part of such 
arrangements, have been subjected to domestic 
servitude or forced prostitution. Finally, Chinese 
and Vietnamese crime syndicates have facilitated 
the sale of Vietnamese children to cannabis farms 
in the UK and Denmark.   14
The Vietnamese government passed a new anti-
trafficking law in 2012 and defined penalties for 
violation of the law in 2013. However, they have 
yet to prosecute any offenders under the law. 
Multiple NGOs in Vietnam run programmes dedi-
cated to stopping human trafficking in and out-
side the country. These include shelters for traf-
ficking victims, awareness campaigns targeting 
vulnerable groups and workshops with immigra-
tion and border officials. 
❖ Growing incomes in both Vietnam and neigh-
bouring China have increased demand for tradi-
tional medicine and rare animal parts, fuelling the 
illegal wildlife trade along the northern border. 
 Achievements and Challenges, 9.12
 “Vietnam Country Profile,” Landmine & Cluster Munition Monitor, accessed 22 February 2015, http://www.the-monitor.org/index.php/cp/13
display/region_profiles/profile/1022.
 Trafficking in Persons Report. Washington, D.C.: U.S. State Department, June 2014, 408–409, accessed 22 February 2015, http://www.s14 -
tate.gov/j/tip/rls/tiprpt/2014/index.htm.
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Because of its proximity to China and relatively 
porous borders, northern Vietnam has become a 
hub for illegal wildlife trafficking. Several endan-
gered or threatened species, such as tigers, ele-
phants, pangolins and rhinoceros, are used in 
traditional medicinal preparations from both 
countries. Animal parts, including horns, claws, 
blood and hides, are transported from Africa or 
other parts of Asia and sold on the Vietnamese 
market or smuggled north to be sold in China. 
Parcel carriers and shipping companies are often 
unaware of illegal contents or otherwise do not 
possess adequate oversight procedures to pre-
vent poachers from using their services. Vietnam 
is also home to a number of “bear bile farms,” 
which extract the gall of moon bears (ursus thi-
betanus) for use in traditional medicines. Bear bile 
farming is illegal in Vietnam. 
C. Insights from the Vietnam Labs 
❖ Keeping it local — With increased domestic 
incomes and external funding drying up, locally-
driven social enterprises are now a viable possi-
bility in Vietnam. 
 
In the years following the World Bank’s 2008 des-
ignation of Vietnam as a “lower middle income” 
country, international foundations and overseas 
development agencies have begun to reëvaluate 
their aid strategies. The 2008 financial crisis seri-
ously damaged the endowments of several in-
ternational philanthropic organisations. After los-
ing nearly one-third of its assets, the Ford Founda-
tion made the strategic decision to shut its Hanoi 
office in 2009 and significantly reduce pro-
gramme support to rural poverty initiatives in 
Vietnam. Ford Foundation grants in 2007 com-
posed 80 percent of total U.S. philanthropic grant 
dollars to Vietnam.  15
Major development agencies have also indicated 
their intention to reduce aid dollars to Vietnam, 
with the Australian, Canadian, Danish, Swedish 
and American governments each reporting re-
ductions or withdrawals within the next five years. 
The British ambassador to Vietnam announced in 
March 2011 that the UK’s Department for In-
ternational Development would cut aid to 16 
middle income countries, including Vietnam, and 
“re-focus” support to 26 least developed coun-
tries.  For the time being, total ODA to Vietnam 16
continues to grow, having risen from US$2.94 
billion in 2010 to US$4.12 billion in 2012, but de-
velopment agencies have largely shifted pro-
gramme funding away from poverty reduction in 
favour of environmental, governance and human 
rights initiatives.  Vietnamese SIOs traditionally 17
involved in poverty reduction work reported to 
ISL that they have struggled to secure funding 
from international sources in the past years. 
12.5 percent of Vietnamese in 2012 lived on less 
than US$2 per day, and there remain significant 
numbers of urban and rural poor, including ethnic 
minorities, with few opportunities to escape the 
poverty cycle. In order to fill the looming gap left 
by major international donors, Vietnamese SIOs 
will have to increasingly secure funding from local 
sources.  
Business models can provide the social sector 
with viable alternatives to external funding, espe-
cially as Vietnam opens itself to new consumer 
markets. Since the 1986 Doi Moi reforms, the 
Vietnamese have increasingly turned to en-
trepreneurial activities as their primary means of 
income. According to the Ministry of Planning and 
Investment, 208,009 new small-medium enter-
prises registered with the government between 
2007 and 2009.  Although they only represent a 18
fraction of Vietnam’s startup scene, social entre- 
 Mike Spector, “Ford Foundation to Close Two Overseas Offices.” Wall Street Journal, 29 April 2009.15
 Nguyen Dinh Cung et al.,  “Social Enterprise in Vietnam: Concept, Context and Policies” (Hanoi: The British Council, 2012), 35.16
 “World Development Indicators,” The World Bank.17
 “Small-Medium Enterprises in Vietnam,” Business-in-Asia, accessed 22 February 2015, http://www.business-in-asia.com/vietnam/18
sme_in_vietnam.html.
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preneurs in both Hanoi and HCMC have pio-
neered business models that provide vocational 
training, health care and sustainable livelihoods 
for Vietnam’s poor as an alternative to traditional 
grant-based aid. A 2011 study commissioned by 
the British Council noted nearly 200 social enter-
prises in Vietnam.  19
Vietnamese social enterprises currently focus on 
tourist markets for handicraft goods and hospitali-
ty services. Prominent examples include Mekong 
Quilts, which provides raw textiles and distribu-
tion services to rural weavers, and Know One 
Teach One (KOTO), which employs and trains 
street youth as hospitality staff. However, increas-
ing domestic incomes, especially in urban areas, 
will create new opportunities in the upcoming 
years for social enterprises to sell products direct-
ly to Vietnamese. 
Vietnam’s relatively stable technological in-
frastructure provides additional opportunities for 
social entrepreneurs to employ web and mobile-
based applications to address the country’s social 
and environmental challenges. Vietnam’s internet 
broadband capacity (360 Gbps), although lag-
ging behind Thailand (463 Gbps) and Malaysia 
(400 Gbps), is significantly stronger than neigh-
bouring Cambodia (11 Gbps) and Laos (2.5 
Gbps).  Startup incubators, such as Hanoi-based 20
Hatch! have sponsored networking events and 
“hackathons” to bring social sector workers to-
gether with technology entrepreneurs. Charity 
Map, a Vietnamese crowdfunding website dedi-
cated to social causes, raised over US$50,000 
online between 2013 and 2014. Vietnam also has 
more mobile phone subscriptions (135 million) 
than inhabitants (90.8 million).  21
Social enterprises have been enormously suc-
cessful in the U.S. and Europe at providing sus-
tainable solutions to social problems, but the sec-
tor is still in its infancy in Vietnam and Southeast 
Asia at large. One Vietnamese social enterprise 
interviewed had cleared US$1.3 million in sales in 
2012, but this is only a fraction of the billions of 
dollars in ODA that flow into the country each 
year. Business models are also vulnerable to the 
vagaries of the market. Vietnam has experienced 
widespread inflation in the past seven years, and 
small commercial firms—let alone social enterpris-
es—have had significant trouble staying afloat. 
Vietnamese social entrepreneurs are not in a posi-
tion at the moment to “take over” from traditional 
grant-based NGOs. Before foreign aid dries up, 
Vietnam will require a significant expansion of the 
social enterprise sector, including increased 
donor matching, a larger pool of human capital 
and streamlined registration procedures. 
❖ Caveat Emptor — Impact investing is an excit-
ing new funding tool for Vietnamese social en-
trepreneurs, but it is still in its infancy stage and 
could potentially lead to troubling debt and eq-
uity arrangements.  
According to interviewees, one of the key chal-
lenges Vietnamese social entrepreneurs face is 
access to venture capital funding and investors. In 
the last decade, incubators supporting technolo-
gy entrepreneurs have cropped up in both Hanoi 
and HCMC. However, only two organisations cur-
rently provide venture capital to Vietnamese so-
cial entrepreneurs: the Center for Social Innova-
tion Promotion (CSIP) and the Spark Center for 
Social Entrepreneurship Development. CSIP pro-
vides up to US$10,000 in seed funding each year 
to three social enterprises accepted to its incuba-
tor programme and up to US$30,000 in funding 
each year to three existing SEs to expand and 
scale successful operations as part of its accelera-
tor programme. The Spark Center does not dis-
pense startup funding, but it awarded 19 estab-
lished SEs grants of US$5,000–20,000 each to 
scale their operations in 2014. Last year, the Spark 
Center received more than 300 applications for 
grants.  22
 Nguyen et al., 9.19
 Michael Ruddy and Esra Ozdemir, An In-Depth Study of Broadband Infrastructure in the ASEAN Region (Bangkok: UNESCAP, August 20
2013), 7.
 Ibid., 129.21
 Spark Center for Social Entrepreneurship Development in conversation with the author, February 2014.22
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International impact investors moving into Viet-
nam, such as IIX Asia, LGT Venture Philanthropy 
and Unitus Capital, can potentially fill existing 
funding gaps for social enterprises. In 2013 Viet-
nam-based VinaCapital Group created Lotus Im-
pact Fund, which has already provided one round 
of funding to KOTO. Netherlands-based Oxfam 
Novib is also planning to use past proceeds from 
microcredit programmes to create an “inclusive 
impact investment fund” for rural SME owners in 
Vietnam, Nigeria and Uganda.  
Impact investment funds typically arrange invest-
ments with social enterprises under a combina-
tion of debt and equity agreements. Investors 
accept reduced returns of 7–9 percent on impact 
investments (compared to the 17–25 percent re-
turns usually accumulated on standard commer-
cial investments in Vietnam).  Impact investment 23
funds have the potential to offer dong on a scale 
significantly larger than the grants offered by in-
cubators and accelerators. Lotus Impact Fund is 
aiming to raise US$50 million for investments 
over the next 10 years. Oxfam Novib has set aside 
US$8 million for investments in Vietnam.  24
However, impact investment’s ability to maximise 
social impact while at the same time generating 
attractive returns for investors is still untested, and 
it remains to be seen what repercussions capitalis-
ing the social sector will produce. Purely profit-
driven private equity firms do not invest in social 
enterprises because the latter organisations typi-
cally carry increased risk paired with low returns. 
To correct for this, many impact investment firms 
provide business consulting to ensure that SEs 
produce reasonable returns. However, when an 
impact investor provides funding for a given SE to 
scale its operations, it is not clear whether the 
priority become increased social impact or main-
taining attractive returns. It is also unclear whether 
the markets in which social entrepreneurs operate 
are elastic enough to accept larger firms in 
greater numbers doing similar things. Multiple 
impact investment funds flooding rural markets 
with capital may increase revenues, but profit 
margins may also shrink to the point of endanger-
ing livelihoods. 
Vietnam’s largest social enterprise cleared US$1.3 
million in sales in 2012, but its profits have suf-
fered in the last two years after a severe decline in 
tourism. Although business models can provide 
sustainable sources of income, they are also vul-
nerable to the vagaries of the market. Indebted 
organisations may find themselves scrambling to 
repay interest or recover losses at the expense of 
social impact. Or worse, they may find themselves 
at debt levels impossible to repay. 2011 saw over-
proliferation of microcredit loans in India and 
other developing countries, leading to wide-
spread bankruptcies and even suicides. Over 
zealous impact investments could create a similar 
bubble in upcoming years if SEs are unable to 
generate returns as promised—all at the expense 
of professed social agendas. 
❖ Making do with a socialist-oriented market 
economy — Vietnam’s government has strict mea-
sures in place to control civil society, but enter-
prises, including social enterprises, experience 
less friction with the government.  
In spite of piecemeal liberalisation of the econo-
my, the Vietnamese Communist Party (VCP) main-
tains a tight level of control on activities in the 
country. In theory, the VCP represents the workers 
and farmers of Vietnam and holds a monopoly on 
civil society through various party instruments, 
such as the Farmers’ Union, Youth Union and 
Women’s Union. Furthermore, the role of civil so-
ciety in mobilising political demonstrations in 
other Southeast Asian countries, such as Malaysia 
and the Philippines, has provided the party with 
the rationale to keep NGOs under strict regula-
tions. 
In practice, this means that the government has 
created few means for local NGOs, even those 
with apolitical agendas, to register with the gov-
ernment. Decrees 177 and 148 allow for the es-
tablishment of social and charity funds, but these 
 Lotus Impact Fund in conversation with the author, December 2014.23
 Oxfam in conversation with the author, February 2015.24
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require substantial backing from the government 
in order to receive permits. Most organisations 
registered under the above two decrees are 
chaired by former government officials or VCP 
members. Local NGOs without access to political 
elites have registered as “Science and Technology 
Organisations” under Decree 35. However, the 
latter designation does not entitle NGOs or their 
donors to tax breaks. 
Registration for Science and Technology Organi-
sations must be renewed every three months at 
both the central and local levels. This short time 
window hampers long term projects and provides 
opportunities for government officials to demand 
“coordination fees” or otherwise obstruct opera-
tions under the pretence of political stability. The 
government also reserves the right to cancel 
events deemed politically liable. Several NGOs 
interviewed reported that government offices had 
cancelled events as little as 12 hours before 
scheduled. The presence of multiple government 
offices, all of which must give their approval, ex-
acerbates the problem. 
International NGOs, whose permits are handled 
by the People’s Aid Coordination Committee 
(PACCOM), have encountered similar issues with 
government approval. Interviewees had only pos-
itive things to say about PACCOM’s registration 
procedures, but added that local offices must 
approve INGO funding to local NGOs. Decree 93 
stipulates that all foreign funding must be ap-
proved before it can be dispersed, and approval 
itself may take up to six months. Because INGOs 
and aid agencies often execute development 
programmes through local NGO partners, they 
experience albeit indirectly many of the same 
delays and harassment reported by local NGOs. 
Budgeting for lengthy approval times may be 
feasible for large projects, but it effectively kills 
smaller projects. 
On the other hand, Vietnam’s government is rela-
tively open to businesses and entrepreneurs, in-
cluding social enterprises and social entrepre-
neurs. Vietnam recently passed a new enterprise 
law in 2005 that allows for social enterprises to 
register as commercial businesses. SEs that regis-
ter as businesses face fewer registration hurdles 
than those that register with the Ministry of Sci-
ence and Technology. However, SEs registered as 
businesses and their funders are not currently 
entitled to any tax breaks. For the past seven 
years, CSIP has been lobbying for such a designa-
tion. PACCOM estimates that the Vietnamese Na-
tional Assembly will draft a separate social enter-
prise law with corresponding tax incentives within 
the next 2–3 years.  Because they are profit-mak25 -
ing businesses at their core, SEs do not pose the 
same challenge to the government or the VCP as 
civil society groups.  
❖ Building human capacity — The increasing role 
of social enterprise and impact investing in Viet-
nam is raising demand for business management 
and leadership skills. 
The shift away from foreign-funded grants and aid 
towards locally-managed social impact pro-
grammes is placing an increasing level of respon-
sibility in the hands Vietnamese SIO workers. So-
cial entrepreneurs potentially have access to mil-
lions of dollars via impact investors, but without 
adequate business skills, they will be unable to 
meet expected returns. In order to fully leverage 
investor interest, social entrepreneurs, most of 
whom do not have business backgrounds, will 
require training in financial management, sales, 
marketing and business planning. 
Social entrepreneurs will also need to be able to 
think creatively if they are going to formulate in-
novative solutions for Vietnam’s social and envi-
ronmental problems. For the past two decades, 
Vietnamese SIOs have largely limited themselves 
to executing programmes and agendas designed 
by well-funded international organisations, leav-
ing few locals with any leadership experience. 
However, the recent shift towards locally-driven 
organisations places the onus of initiating and 
designing programmes on local SIOs. As they 
transition from passive implementors to active 
innovators, Vietnamese SIO personnel will require 
additional leadership skills, such as systems think-
ing and problem solving. By nature, social enter-
 PACCOM in conversation with the author, February 2015.25
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prises face steeper challenges than commercial 
businesses. SEs that employ the disabled or dis-
enfranchised will require innovative and well-
trained HR managers to compensate for expected 
productivity losses. SEs working in remote regions 
will have to design creative solutions to minimise 
deficits in distribution chains and road in-
frastructure.  
Vietnamese SIOs are still forced to send staff 
abroad to the U.S. or Europe for extended train-
ing, thereby losing precious human resources. 
However, there are an increasing number of local 
centres providing business management and 
social innovation training. CSIP, the Spark Center 
and Hatch! each run one or more programmes 
dedicated to business skills, information technol-
ogy, accounting or legal procedures. Impact in-
vestors, including IIX Asia, LGT Venture Philan-
thropy, Lotus Impact Fund and Unitus Capital, also 
conduct their own business consulting to bring 
social enterprises up to an acceptable level of 
returns for investors. 
Imparting skill sets from foreign organisations to 
local (often rural) entrepreneurs in need of train-
ing is often hampered by language barriers. To 
overcome this issue, several organisations have 
instituted training of trainers (ToT) programmes. 
For instance, Oxfam Novib currently plans to train 
35 bilingual consultants over 4-6 months as part 
of its inclusive impact investment fund. These 
consultants will in turn mentor rural SME owners 
on topics such as business strategy, human re-
sources and accounting. The Finnish govern-
ment’s Innovation Partnership Program will train 
20 bilingual “fellows” during a two-month immer-
sion. Fellows will in turn become the trainers for a 
six-month accelerator programme running until 
2018. 
 
Ultimately, the mark of a successful social enter-
prise is whether it is able to scale its operations 
while moving beyond the social entrepreneur 
who founded it. As organisations become more 
complex, they require additional skill sets that the 
founder may not possess. SEs, like any business, 
will need to build their financial and institutional 
sustainability through improved human resources. 
❖ Thinking strategically — In spite of the increas-
ing importance of social business methods, there 
will always remain social issues unsuited to rev-
enue-based approaches. Vietnam requires robust 
local philanthropic institutions to complement its 
social enterprises and impact investors.  
Social enterprise and impact investment offer new 
opportunities for Vietnamese to pioneer solutions 
to stubborn social problems and poverty, but not 
all social ills are conducive to generating profits. 
For instance, building (or rebuilding) in-
frastructure, and providing emergency food, wa-
ter and shelter to displaced peoples, are simply 
incapable of generating short term returns. Rev-
enue-driven models are limited to providing vo-
cations and livelihoods to the disadvantaged and 
marginalised. 
Philanthropic grants, when managed with an eye 
for sustainability, have produced substantial re-
sults in lowering poverty worldwide—and without 
putting small-scale entrepreneurs in debt. As for-
eign dollars begin to disappear, it is more impor-
tant than ever for Vietnam to develop its own 
homegrown philanthropic institutions. The Viet-
namese have more disposable income today than 
ever before. Per capita gross national income in 
Vietnam grew from US$200 in 1994 to US$1,740 
in 2013.  However, Vietnamese giving is still 26
largely underdeveloped. Surveys conducted by 
the Asia Foundation in 2011 revealed that Viet-
namese households on average donated only 
VND 800,000 (US$40), or about two percent of 
their annual income, to charitable causes.  27
Today, Vietnamese corporate philanthropy is pri-
marily piecemeal, with few private-sector organi-
sations maintaining longterm ties with local 
NGOs. A 2013 Asia Foundation survey of 500 
 “World Development Indicators,” The World Bank.26
 Dang Nguyen Anh et al., Philanthropy in Vietnam (Hanoi: The Asia Foundation, 2011), 1.27
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Vietnamese businesses found that only 45 sur-
veyed had active partnerships with NGOs.  The 28
Vietnamese government provides few monetary 
incentives for large-scale philanthropy, but even 
more importantly, Vietnamese corporations sim-
ply have not developed the culture of phil-
anthropic giving associated with the Carnegies, 
Fords or Rockefellers. Although local companies 
have adequate funds, few practise “strategic phil-
anthropy” or otherwise contribute their funds to-
wards providing innovative sustainable solutions 
to social problems. Vietnamese corporations are 
largely reluctant to extend philanthropic opera-
tions beyond bursaries and support for religious 
institutions. 
Philanthropic institutions in Vietnam still largely 
function within a traditional charitable mindset. 
Public opinion holds that employees in the social 
sector should be volunteers or accept only mini-
mal salaries. Few corporate donors feel justified 
funding "back end" costs, including salaries or 
administration. With SIO workers in Vietnam cur-
rently earning less than half of what their private-
sector counterparts are earning, Vietnamese SIOs 
are challenged to recruit and retain quality talent. 
However, it is high-cost talented people who are 
able to design innovative programmes that lead 
to systemic change. One notable exception to the 
above rule is VinaCapital Foundation. VinaCapital 
Group funds the foundation’s administration costs 
and matches donations to individual programmes 
made by outside corporations. By making a 
commitment to support VCF’s day-to-day costs, 
VinaCapital has ensured  its CSR arm's long term 
sustainability and success.  
 Giang Dang and Pham Minh Tri, Corporate Philanthropy and Corporate Perceptions of Local NGOs in Vietnam (Hanoi: The Asia Founda28 -
tion, October 2013), 7.
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V. List of Organisations Interviewed 
5 Gio Sang. Ho Chi Minh City, 23 December 2014. 
Asia Injury Prevention Foundation. Ho Chi Minh City, 22 December 2014. 
Boston Consulting Group. Hanoi, 2 February 2015. 
Breast Cancer Awareness Network. Ho Chi Minh City, 23 December 2014. 
Center for Community Support Development Studies (CECODES). Hanoi, 2 February 2015. 
Center for Social Initiatives Promotion (CSIP). Hanoi, 3 February 2015. 
Charity Map. Ho Chi Minh City, 22 December 2014. 
Disability Research & Capacity Development (DRD Vietnam). Ho Chi Minh City, 23 December 2014. 
Dynasty Investments. Ho Chi Minh City, 5 February 2015. 
ECO Vietnam Group. Ho Chi Minh City, 20 and 23 December 2014. 
Habataku Inc. Ho Chi Minh City, 23 December 2014 and 5 February 2015. 
Hatch! Hanoi, 2 February 2015. 
IIX Asia. Singapore, 10 December 2014. 
Indochina Research & Consulting. Hanoi, 2 February 2015. 
Innovation Partnership Program. Ho Chi Minh City, 4 February 2015. 
Institute for Studies of Society (iSEE). Hanoi, 2 February 2015. 
LIN Center for Community Development. Ho Chi Minh City, 23 December 2014 and 4 February 2015. 
Lotus Impact Fund. Ho Chi Minh City, 22 December 2014. 
Mekong Plus. Ho Chi Minh City, 23 December 2014. 
Nghiem Minh Association. Ho Chi Minh City, 23 December 2014. 
Nielsen Corporation. Singapore, 25 November 2014. 
Oxfam Novib. Hanoi, 2 February 2015. 
Oxfam Vietnam. Hanoi, 2 February 2015. 
Pacific Links Foundation. Ho Chi Minh City, 5 February 2015. 
People’s Aid Coordinating Committee (PACCOM). Hanoi, 2 February 2015. 
Sarus Exchange Program. Singapore, 2 December 2014.  
Solidarités Jeunesses Vietnam. Ho Chi Minh City, 4 February 2015.  
Spark Center for Social Entrepreneurship Development. Hanoi, 3 February 2015. 
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TRAFFIC. Hanoi, 2 February 2015. 
Vietnam National University. Hanoi, 2 February 2015. 
Villgro. Singapore, 23 February 2015. 
VinaCapital. Ho Chi Minh City, 4 February 2015. 
VinaCapital Foundation. Ho Chi Minh City, 22 December 2014 and 4 February 2015. 
Wildlife at Risk. Ho Chi Minh City, 22 December 2014.  
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ORGANISATIONS BY SECTOR
Media & Academia
1Commercial
5
Government
1
SIO
28
SIO SUB-SECTORS
Incubators
7
Impact Investors
3
Social Ent.
2Corporate Phil.
1
Nonprofits
15
Total Organisations Interviewed: 35 
SIO: 28 
 Nonprofits: 15 
 Corporate Philanthropies: 1 
 Social Enterprises: 2 
 Impact Investors: 3 
 Incubators: 7 
Government: 1 
Commercial: 5 
Media & Academia: 1
VI. Questions for Interviewees 
Organisational History  
1) How and why was your organisation established? Is there a founding story? 
2) For international organisations – Why did your organisation decide to enter Vietnam?  
Operations  
3) On what projects are you currently working? What would success look like one year from 
 now? Five years from now? 
4) How successful were your past programmes? What is your organisation doing differently 
 from when it first began operations in Vietnam? 
5) Do you foresee any upcoming difficulties?  
6) What does your organisation need to make your programmes more effective?  
Strategies  
7) What are your organisation’s goals for the next 3-5 years? How do you plan to meet those 
 goals? 
8) What factors might jeopardise the success of your overall strategy?  
Collaboration  
9) Were there any difficulties or pitfalls in past collaborations? Have any difficulties surfaced in 
 your current collaborations?  
10)  Have you collaborated with organisations outside your sector? How could such  
 relationships be improved or facilitated?  
11) Is there any individual or organisation with whom you would like to collaborate but have 
 been unable to do so?  
Human Resources  
12) Do you generally source staff locally or from overseas? Have you had any difficulties finding 
 skilled local staff?  
13) Which professional skills, if any, do local staff currently lack? What do local staff need to  
 succeed in today’s workplace?  
14) How would you evaluate local educational institutions in preparing future employees? Are 
 there private or foreign institutions attempting to fill any gaps?  
Leadership  
15) What does effective leadership—in business, government or civil society—look like to you? 
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16) What skills and resources do Vietnamese leaders need to better serve their society?  
17) The Institute broadly defines societal leadership as “the practice of creating sustainable  
 value and impact for the betterment of society within one’s sphere of influence.” Are there 
 any remarkable individuals in Vietnam whom you would consider a societal leader? 
Sustainability & CSR 
18) Does you organisation have any sustainability guidelines? How did you determine your  
 current guidelines? 
19) Does your organisation engage in any Corporate Social Responsibility  (CSR) initiatives?  
 Have you been able to measure the impact of your organisation’s CSR programmes? 
Funding (for civic-sector organisations) 
20) Roughly speaking, how is your organisation currently funded?  
21) How financially self-sustaining is your organisation at the moment? Do you have any plans 
 to lower dependence on outside funding in the future? 
Context  
22) How does working in Vietnam differ from working in other Southeast Asian countries? What 
 does Vietnam have in common with the rest of the region?  
23) How do minorities (ethnic, religious, or otherwise) fit into the landscape? Do minorities  
 actively collaborate with the status quo?  
24) Outside of your own organisation’s scope, what are the key problem areas facing Vietnam?  
25) How is Vietnam different from five years ago? How do you imagine it will change in the next 
 five years?  
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